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BAR BRIEFS
4,001 to 6,000 Population
City Population Salary
Devils Lake .................................................... 5,451 $420
D ickinson ............................................................ 5,025 600
M andan ........................................................... 5,027 360
V alley City ...................................................... 5,260 400
W illiston ........................................................ 5,106 855 *
*-Represents average for past two years, reduction from $900




Bismarck ........................................................ 11,090 $ 900
Grand Forks .................................................... 17,112 1,620
Fargo .............................................................. 28,609 2,460
M inot ............................................................ 16,099 1,620
The average for these four cities was $1,650, with the highest
setting a none too liberal standard.
MINNESOTA MORTGAGE MORATORIUM CASE
In an address before the Kansas City Bar Association, Hon. John
T. Fitzsimmons, of the Supreme Court of Missouri, discussed the
majority and minority opinions of the U. S. Supreme Court in Loan
Association vs. Blaisdell, (decided Jan. 8, 1934).
The leading case, Bronson vs. Kinzie, 42 U. S. 311, grew out of
debtor relief acts passed in the distress period of 1837. The head note
of that decision reads:
"A state, law, passed subsequently to the execution of a
mortgage, which declares that the equitable estate of the
mortgagor shall not be extinguished for twelve months after a
sale under a decree in chancery, and which prevents any sale
unless two-thirds of the amount at which the property has
been valued by appraisers shall be bid therefor, is within the
clause of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitu-
tion of the U. S., which prohibits a state from passing a law
impairing the obligation of contracts."
McCracken vs. Hayward, 43 U. S. 608, made a similar ruling with
respect to another act of similar import. So also Howard vs. Bugbee,
65 U. S. 461.
The Minnesota decision distinguished these cases, Justice Hughes
stating:
"None of these cases is directly applicable to the question
now before us in view of the conditions with which the Minne-
sota statute seeks to safeguard the interests of the mortgagee-
purchaser during the extended period."
Mr. Fitzsimmons concedes that the Court of 1840 would have
declared the Minnesota act unconstitutional, believing that Chief Justice
Taney and his associates would not have deemed that which is the
essence of the Hughes opinion (depression, emergency, reservation of
police power, interest of the general welfare) as sufficient to depart
from the "right and remedy" theory; but he points out that there was a
decided difference in the causes of the 1837 panic and the 1929 break-
down. "The Treasury," as he says, was, by reason of these causes,
"most concerned with the collection of moneys due to the Government
in order to meet its commitments."
BAR BRIEFS
The Minnesota case dealt with the extension of the period of
redemption "for such additional time as the court may deem just and
equitable," an extension to be made upon application to the court, on
notice, for an order determining the reasonable value of the income on
the property involved in the sale, or if it has no income, then the
reasonable rental value of the property, and directing the mortgagor
"to pay all or a reasonable part of the income or rental value, in or
toward the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, mortgage . . . indebt-
edness at such times and in such manner" as shall be determined by
the court.
"The outstanding differences," says Mr. Fitzsimmons, "between
the two opinions (majority and minority) is their contrary views of the
materiality of a conceded economic emergency to a right decision of
the case." The majority argued "while emergency does not create power,
emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power ... may
afford a reason for the exertion of a living power already enjoyed."
The minority reasoned "If the contract impairment clause, when
framed and adopted, meant that the terms of a contract for the payment
of money could not be altered in invitum by a state statute enacted
for the relief of hardly pressed debtors to the end and with the effect
of postponing payment or enforcement during and because of an
economic or financial emergency, it is but to state the obvious to say
that it means the same now"; and "The Minnesota statute either impairs
the obligation of contracts or it does not. If it does not, the occasion to
which it relates becomes immaterial, since then the passage of the
statute is the exercise of a normal, unrestricted state power and requires
no special occasion to render it effective. If it does, the emergency no
more furnishes a proper occasion for its exercise than if the emergency
were non existent. And so, while in form, the suggested distinction
seems to put us forward in a straight line, in reality it simply carries
us back in a circle, like bewildered travelers lost in a wood, to the
point where we parted company with the view of the state court."
Voicing his belief that the standard of authority of the majority
opinion is superior to that of the minority, Mr. Fitzsimmons summarizes
the basis of the majority opinion thus:
1. An emergency existed which furnished a proper occasion for
the exercise of the reserved power of the state to protect the vital
interests of the community.
2. The legislation was addressed to a legitimate end, that is, the
legislation was not for the mere advantage of particular individuals but
for the protection of a basic interest of society.
3. In view of the nature of the contracts in question-mortgages
of unquestionable validity-the relief afforded and justified by the
emergency, in order not to contravene the constitutional provision, could
only be of a character appropriate to that emergency and could be
granted only upon reasonable conditions.
4. The conditions upon which the period of redemption is extended
do not appear to be unreasonable. The initial extension of the time of
redemption for thirty days from the approval of the Act was obviously
to give a reasonable opportunity for the authorized application to the
court.
5. The legislation is temporary in operation. It is limited to the
exigency which called it forth. While the postponement of the period
of redemption from the foreclosure sale is to May 1, 1935, that period
BAR BRIEFS
may be reduced by the order of the court under the statute in case of a
change in circumstances, and the operation of the statute itself could
not validly outlast the emergency or be so extended as virtually to
destroy the contracts.
It may not be amiss to emphasize three points in addition: 1. Proper
and appropriate legislation, within the terms of the Constitution; 2. Fair,
equitable, legal administration by the courts of the land; 3. Fair and
equitable consideration of the interests of the creditor.
NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Halvorson vs. Haugen: Defendants contested the validity of
plaintiff's tax deed. Chapter 288, Laws of 1931, provides, "Whenever
in any action at law or equity the validity of any tax deed is questioned,
upon pleadings or otherwise, the action shall not proceed until the party
assailing such deed shall, within such time as the court shall deem reason-
able, deposit in court for the benefit of the party claiming thereunder
an amount equal to the sum paid by said party to the county for the
purchase of the property covered by the tax deed, together with costs
and disbursements of the action then incurred by the party claiming
under such deed." At the opening of the fall term of the district court
the plaintiff gave notice that he would demand such deposit. On Nov.
19, 1932, the trial court entered its order, pursuant to such notice,
fixing the date on or before which such deposit was to be made at
Dec. 20, 1932, and specifying the amount at $900 principal and $34.50
costs. On Dec. 21, 1932, the plaintiff and the defendant appeared by
counsel, and a hearing was had. The defendant's proof tended to show
that the property was the family home, and was worth about $3,000.
The trial court entered an order extending the time for making the
deposit to Jan. 21, 1933, and granted terms of $50 for making the
extension. The deposit was not made, and on Jan. 26, 1933, the trial
court made its order striking the defendant's answer, took proof, and
entered judgment. HELD: That the procedure provided by the statute
is a harsh one, formerly unknown in this jurisdiction; that the claim
that the remedy provided by the statute to compel the deposit would
be ineffective is a matter for legislative and not judicial consideration;
that, having prescribed both the rule of action and the method of
enforcing it, neither the rule nor the method may be extended by
judicial interpretation.
THE BAR HAS A VOICE-USE IT
Under the above heading, President Anderson of the Los Angeles
Bar Association makes some rather pointed statements concerning the
appropriateness and the necessity of more news-giving to the public by
the various associations. "Its voice," he says, "would not be as one
crying in the wilderness, but could and should be as the voice of truth
shouting from the housetops. It can reach every nook and cranny in
the land. All that is necessary is the will to speak."
The particular mouthpiece of the Bar of this State should be the
Committee on Press and Public Information. In co-operation with the
President of the Association it should, we believe, give to the public,
through the various newspapers and the Associated Press the annual
story of the work of the Association, as exemplified by its district and
general meetings. Explanatory, informational stories, issued monthly
to the press, would be welcomed, we are convinced.
